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Abstract
This Article examines the European Community Council Regulation No. 4064/89 which
entered into force in September 1990. The focus of the Commission’s activity has been on the
definition of a concentration pursuant to article 3 and on the substantive appraisal of concentrations
pursuant to article 2. On the basis of the decisions issued within the period under examination, it
is possible to discern an emerging administrative practice. Additionally, initial developments of
interest are apparent in other areas, such as the notification requirement, thresholds and various
procedural matters.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Community (the "EC") Council Regulation
No. 4064/89 (the "Merger Regulation")' entered into force in
September 1990. As of November 1991, sixty-five concentra-
tions had been notified to the Commission. More than fifty
proceedings have been completed. In four cases, the Merger
Regulation was ruled inapplicable pursuant to article 6(1)(a).2
The great majority of the concentrations were "cleared" after
one month as a result of a non-opposition decision pursuant to
article 6(1)(b). In five cases, the Commission initially raised
serious doubts and decided to open the four-month review
procedure under article 6(1) (c). Subsequently, four concentra-
tions were declared compatible with the Common Market
under article 8(2), with some cases being subject to obliga-
tions. By the end of November 1991, one concentration had
been prohibited pursuant to article 8(3) in conjunction with
article 2(3). Of these, U.S. firms were involved in ten cases and
Japanese firms in four.
1. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in OJ.
L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
2. Articles without references refer to the Merger Regulation.
3. Decisions of the Commission under article 8 are published in their entirety,
including the grounds for decision, in the OfficialJournal of the European Communi-
ties. So far five decisions have been published: Arospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland,
OJ. L 334/42 (1991); Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26 (1991); Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, OJ.
L 290/35 (1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep.
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The focus of the Commission's activity has been on the
definition of a concentration pursuant to article 3 and on the
substantive appraisal of concentrations pursuant to article 2.
On the basis of the decisions issued within the period under
examination, it is possible to discern an emerging administra-
tive practice. Additionally, initial developments of interest are
apparent in other areas, such as the notification requirement,
thresholds and various procedural matters.
I. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
A. Concentrations with a Community Dimension
The constitutive element of "Community dimension" in
article 1(2) is, in practice, straightforward.4 In the case of the
notification of a joint venture, it is sufficient if each of at least
two parent companies realize an aggregate Community-wide
turnover of more than 250 million ECU. Whether the joint
venture achieves this threshold is immaterial.5 A concentra-
tion may still have Community-wide significance if one of the
undertakings concerned realizes two-thirds of its Community-
wide turnover in one Member State.6
Under article 5(1)(2), the definition of Community-wide
turnover and turnover in a Member State is based on the domi-
cile of the recipient of the goods or services. Thus imports to
the EC from non-Member States qualify, whereas exports from
the EC to non-Member States do not.7
(CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146; Alcatel/relettra, OJ. L 122/48 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778.
Decisions under article 6(1) (a) and (b) are merely announced by a brief notice in
the Official Journal, Series C. Parties showing sufficient interest may request a copy
of these decisions, including the grounds for decision, from the Commission.
4. See Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop
Merger Control, 59 ANrITRUST L.J. 195 (1990).
5. See Driger/IBM/HMP, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n June 28, 1991), cited in 0J.
C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R, 817; Baxter/Nestl6/Salvia, slip op. 4 (Eur.
Comm'n Feb. 6, 1991), cited in 0J. C 37/11 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
6. Cf Nissan/R. Nissan, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J. C
181/21 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 581; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n
Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
7. See Hans-Jorg Niemeyer, Die Europiische Fusionskontrollverordnung, in
SONDERVEROFFENTLICHUNGEN ZUM RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 12
(1991).
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B. Calculation of Turnover
Under article 5(1), turnover is calculated on the basis of
the preceding complete financial year based on the notification
date. If at the time of notification such figures are not yet avail-
able, the Commission utilizes the figures for the previous fi-
nancial year.8 Turnover must be stated in ECU and calculated
according to the average exchange rate for the year under
Form CO Relating to the Notification of a Concentration Pur-
suant to Council Regulation No. 4064/89 ("Form CO").9 The
Commission also accepts year-end exchange rates.
With regard to the acquisition of shares in companies, to
assess Community dimension the turnover of the acquiror and
of the acquired company must be added together.'" The
seller's turnover is not included. An asset acquisition, the ac-
quisition of a part or parts of an undertaking, is subject to the
same rule. The sole basis is therefore the turnover of the oper-
ation or the asset sold, and not the aggregate turnover of the
seller. The basis has been expressly stated by the Commission
with reference to article 5(2)." In the case of a formation of a
joint venture, the entire turnover of the parent companies and
the joint venture must be added together. 12
Under article 5(4) of the Merger Regulation, calculation of
aggregate turnover must take into account not just the turn-
over of the parties, but also that of undertakings affiliated with
them. This calculation applies to all group companies that
control or are controlled by the undertaking concerned. Such
control does not require, however, an absolute majority of the
capital or voting rights. Thus, for example, a share of 43.7
percent is sufficient, provided that remaining shares are widely
dispersed and all board members were appointed by the share-
8. See ASKO/Jacobs/Adia, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'n May 16, 1991) (providing
for notification in April), cited in O.J. C 132/13 (1991); Fiat Geotech/Ford New Hol-
land, slip op. 5-6 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991), cited in OJ. C 118/14 (1991),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
9. Form CO Relating to the Notification of a Concentration Pursuant to Council
Regulation No. 4064/89, § D, O.J. L 219/11, at 12 (1990) [hereinafter Form CO].
10. Cf Otto/Grattan, slip op. 3-4 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 21, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 93/6 (1991).
11. Promodes/Dirsa, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 17, 1990), cited in O.J. C
321/16 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
12. Cf Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 27, 6 (1991).
1991-1992]
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holder.' 3 On the other hand, control of 45.19 percent of vot-
ing rights as occurred at the last general meeting is insufficient
evidence of the power to appoint over half the members of a
supervisory board.' 4 Consequently, such power presupposes
at least a simple majority of the general meeting.' 5
The Commission views article 5(3) simply as a special
method for calculating turnover, not as a special threshold
clause applicable to insurance companies and banks.' 6 There-
fore, the general rules of article 5, in particular the affiliation
clause, are also applicable to these undertakings. In the Com-
mission's view, the assessment of turnover in the case of insur-
ance undertakings must include not only gross premiums, but
also turnover from the real property transactions of their sub-
sidiaries that have been financed through the premium pay-
ments of the insured.' 7
II. DEFINITION OF CONCENTRATION
A. Merger
In addition to the formal merger," in which two previ-
ously independent undertakings merge, a merger also covers
an "economic merger" under article 3(1)(a).' 9 An economic
merger is a concentration that occurs between two undertak-
ings without the establishment of a parent and subsidiary rela-
13. E.g., Eridania/ISI, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in O.J. C
204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
14. Arjomari-Prioux SA/Wiggins Teape Appleton plc, slip op. 5-7 (Eur.
Comm'n Dec. 12, 1990), cited in O.J. C 321/16 (1990), (1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 854.
15. Id.
16. Cf KELT/American Express, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1991)
(banks), cited in O.J. C 223/38 (1991), [1991].4 C.M.L.R. 740; Kyowa/Saitama Banks,
slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 7, 1991) (banks), cited in O.J. C 66/13 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 331; BNP/Dresdner Bank, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 4, 1991)
(banks), cited in O.J. C 34/20 (1991); Groupe AG/Amev, slip op. 4-5 (Eur.
Comm'n Nov. 21, 1990) (insurance companies), cited in O.J. C 304/27 (1990), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 8.
17. Groupe AG/Amev, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 21, 1990), cited in O.J. C
304/27 (1990), [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
18. See, e.g., Kyowa/Saitama Banks, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 7, 1991),
cited in OJ. C 66/13 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 331.
19. Cf Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Opera-
tions under Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, O.J. C 203/10, at 14, 40 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Merger Guidelines].
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tionship in the form of a combined group.20 This merger can
be created through cross-shareholdings and requires that un-
dertakings establish a "single economic entity."
In the Renault/Volvo 2  decision, the Commission effec-
tively recognized an economic merger subject to the following
conditions. First, the undertakings acquire cross-sharehold-
ings of 45 percent, resulting in an almost equal sharing of prof-
its and losses. Second, they set up a joint committee that can
make binding decisions. Third, they integrate the main opera-
tions of the previously autonomous undertakings. In the Com-
mission's view, this constitutes de facto joint control and irre-
versible reciprocal dependency. 2
B. Acquisition of Control
The acquisition of control, defined in articles 3(1)(b) and
3(3) as the ability to acquire a decisive influence on the opera-
tions of an undertaking, also constitutes a concentration. A
decisive influence does not necessarily require possession of a
majority of the capital or voting rights. In exceptional cases,
however, it can be exercised through a minority interest,23
such as in the acquisition of 39 percent of the shares. 24 The
remainder of the shares must be widely dispersed and the ma-
jor shareholder must hold the majority at the general meet-
ing.25
In the Commission's view, the transition from joint con-
trol to sole control and vice-versa constitutes acquisition of
control because such modifications affect the "quality" of the
controlling influence. 26 The manner in which the control is ex-
20. See id. 41; cf COMMISSION SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 29
(1978).
21. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in O.J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 906.
22. See id. 5.
23. See Eif/Ertoil, slip op. $$ 7, 11 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991) (denying deci-
sive influence with 20.5 percent), cited in O.J. C 124/13 (1991).
24. See John Cook & Trevor Soames, EEC Merger Regulation: A Practical View, 19
INT'L Bus. LAw. 330 (1991).
25. Arjomari-Prioux SA/Wiggins Teape Appleton plc, slip op. 4 (Eur.
Comm'n Dec. 12, 1990) (describing instance where 107,000 shareholders held re-
maining shares, but only three shareholders each held over 3 percent of total equity),
cited in O.J. C 321/16 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 854.
26. See Eridania/ISI, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C
204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. 3 (Eur.
4031991-1992]
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ercised is immaterial; control can be created, for example,
through an exclusive purchasing agreement between a pro-
ducer and its supplier, provided that the supplier is bound ex-
clusively to the producer.27
C. Joint Ventures
The majority of notifications has related to joint ventures.
The Commission has ruled that only a very small number of
the joint ventures notified were cooperative joint ventures and
therefore not concentrations under article 3. This is a surpris-
ing development, given the particularly strict constitutive re-
quirements for a concentrative joint venture in the Commis-
sion's Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative
Operations under Council Regulation No. 4064/89 (the
"Merger Guidelines" ).28
1. Joint Control
Under article 3(2), a joint venture must be controlled
jointly by at least two parent companies. The basis for such
joint control is immaterial. Joint control always exists where
there is equal shareholding with equal voting rights, and it
need not be established by express agreement.29
Where there are no equal voting rights, such as, for exam-
ple, where one company holds only 26 percent of a venture's
votes,3 0 such joint control must be based on the factual and
Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in O.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580;
ASKO/Omni, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C 51/12 (1991),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; ICI/Tioxide, slip op. 44 1-4 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 28, 1990),
cited in O.J. C 304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
27. See RVI/VBC/Heuliez, slip op. 44 4-5 (Eur. Comm'nJune 3, 1991) (control-
ling influence was based both on exclusive purchasing agreement and on interest of 9
percent in supplier undertaking), cited in O.J. C 149/15 (1991).
28. Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, O.J. C 203/10 (1990).
29. See Drager/IBM/HMP, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; ASKO/Omni, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n
Feb. 21, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 51/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Mitsubishi/
UCAR, slip op. 4 5 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 245; Groupe AG/Amev, slip op. 1 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 21, 1990), cited in
0J. C 304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
30. See Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez SA/Hans Brochier GmbH & Co. KG, slip op.
4 (Eur. Comm'n July 11, 1991), cited in O.J. C 188/20 (1991), (1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
663; Conagra/IDEA, slip op. 4 5, 10 (Eur. Comm'n May 30, 1991), cited in 0.J. C
175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
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legal circumstances. The Commission's criterion is based on
whether the minority company is accorded rights beyond the
normal protection of a minority shareholder's interests in the
EC Member States, so that important decisions are subject to
the shareholder's consent.3' The minority shareholder's influ-
ence can be secured if the shareholder is entitled to appoint
half of the members of the managing bodies.3" The criterion
otherwise will be whether the shareholder, for example, can
block strategically important decisions, budget approvals, au-
thorization of major investments, or decisions on profit alloca-
tion.33
2. Concentrative Joint Ventures
The application of the Merger Regulation to a joint ven-
ture is subject to a positive and a negative "condition" pursu-
ant to subparagraph 2 of article 3(2), in conjunction with para-
graph 15 of the Merger Guidelines.34
a. Positive Condition
The joint venture must perform all the functions of an au-
31. See Elf/Enterprise, slip op. t 4 (Eur. Comm'n July 24, 1991), cited in 0J. C
203/14 (1991); Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez SA/Hans Brochier GmbH & Co. KG, slip
op. 4 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 11, 1991), cited in OJ. C 188/20 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
663; Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in OJ.
C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; Conagra/IDEA, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n
May 30, 1991), cited in 0J. C 175/18 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 580; see also Eridania/
ISI, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 30, 1991), cited in 0J. C 204/12 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 663; Usinor/ASD, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in 0J. C
193/34 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
32. Apollinaris/Schweppes, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in
0.J. C 203/14 (1991); Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. $ 7 (Eur. Comm'n June 24,
1991), cited in 0J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; A6rospatiale/MBB, slip
op. 1 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991), cited in 0J. C 59/13 (1991); BNP/Dresdner
Bank, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 4, 1991), cited in 0J. C 34/20 (1991); Mitsub-
ishi/UCAR, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 4, 1991), cited in 0J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 245.
33. Elf/Enterprise, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 24, 1991) (veto right), cited in
0j. C 203/14 (1991); Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez SA/Hans Brochier GmbH & Co.
KG, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 11, 1991), cited in 0J. C 188/20 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 663; Conagra/IDEA, slip op. 11 6, 11 (Eur. Comm'n May 30, 1991), cited in
0J. C 175/18 (1991); A6rospatiale/MBB, slip op. 1 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991),
cited in 0J. C 59/13 (1991); ASKO/Omni, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991),
cited in 0J. C 51/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; see Varta/Bosch, 0J. L 320/26,
at 26, 3 (1991).
34. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, 0J. C 203/10, at 11, $ 15 (1990).
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tonomous economic entity on a lasting basis. This is always
the case if the parent companies invest their business assets in
the joint venture and continue to exist solely as pure financial
holding companies.3 5 It is also sufficient if the parent compa-
nies integrate specific operations in the joint venture, such as
product-related research and development ("R & D"), produc-
tion facilities, and sales and marketing departments. In addi-
tion, the employees of the parent companies in these opera-
tions must be employed in the joint venture, and all important
contracts, official approval, and patents or trademarks must be
assigned or licensed on a lasting basis to the joint venture. 36 It
is immaterial whether the joint venture sells a portion of its
products through the distribution network of a parent com-
pany, and the latter operates only as agent of the joint ven-
ture.37 Nor does it matter whether the parent companies con-
tinue, to a limited extent, their research activities indepen-
dently of each other.38
On the other hand, no autonomous economic entity will
exist if the joint venture merely distributes the products of the
parent companies, 9 or if the parent companies merely spin off
part of their operations and do not assign their patents and
know-how to the joint venture. A mere grant of an exclusive
licence subject to termination at any time, or the sale of the
products of the joint venture under the trademark of the par-
ent companies, will not constitute an autonomous economic
35. Groupe AG/Amev, slip op. 1 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 21, 1990), cited in 0.J. C
304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
36. Varta/Bosch, 0J. L 320/26, at 27, 5 (1991); Driger/IBM/HMP, slip op.
7 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817;
Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in OJ. C
175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n
June 18, 1991), cited in 0J. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; Sanofi/Sterling
Drug, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), cited in 0J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 739; Arospatiale/MBB, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991), cited in
0J. C 59/13 (1991); BNP/Dresdner Bank, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 4, 1991),
cited in 0J. C 34/20 (1991); Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4,
1991), cited in 0J. C 5/7 (1991).
37. Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26, at 27, 5 (1991); Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op.
8 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
38. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), cited in 0J.
C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
39. Baxter/Nestl6/Savia, slip op. $ 6, 8 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 6, 1991), cited in
0.J. C 37/11 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
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venture.40 As a rule, in -such cases no lasting pooling of the
parent companies' operations in the joint venture exists.
b. Negative Condition
Moreover, a joint venture must not involve any coordina-
tion of competitive behaviour, whether it be between the par-
ent companies or among them and the joint venture. In its
Merger Guidelines, the Commission required that "all the par-
ent companies withdraw entirely and permanently from the
[joint venture's] market and do not operate in markets
neighbouring those of the [joint venture].' In practice, how-
ever, the Commission no longer fully adheres to this complete
withdrawal requirement. Thus no adverse effect exists if a par-
ent company continues to operate in the joint venture's market
outside the EC,4 2 acts as the joint venture's commission agent
in the EC or in non-Member States,43 continues research and
development to a limited extent in the area of operation of the
joint venture,44 or continues to operate on a very small scale in
the joint venture's "home market," where the joint venture is
one of the market leaders.4 5
In a further step, if the parent companies have withdrawn,
the Commission examines whether there remains a danger of
reentry into the joint venture's market. In the Commission's
view, a non-competition clause is evidence that there is no such
intention.46 If the parent companies continue to operate in a
neighbouring, upstream or downstream market, there exists
40. Id. 6.
41. Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, 0J. C 203/10, at 12, 20 (1990).
42. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 8 (Eur.
Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
43. Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26, at 27, 5 (1991); Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op.
8 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
44. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), cited in 0J.
C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
45. Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'nJune 18, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 172/
8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'nJan.
4, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
46. Driger/IBM/HMP, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in OJ. C
236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; Conagra/IDEA, slip op. 15 (Eur. Comm'n
May 30, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; ASKO/Omni,
slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991), cited in 0J. C 51/12 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 330; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 4, 1991), cited in 0.J.
C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
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no basis for presuming reentry.47 -Moreover, the financial
strength or technical and organizational know-how of one or
more parent companies is not a sufficient basis to establish po-
tential competition with the joint venture.48 Thus in order to
substantiate a reentry presumption, objective and commer-
cially reasonable motives must be demonstrated.4 9
Where at least one parent company remains in the same
product market as the joint venture or in a neighbouring geo-
graphic market, coordinated competitive behaviour is indi-
cated. 50 In such cases, the parent companies regularly use the
joint venture as an instrument for the coordination of their
market behaviour." In the Commission's view, a division of
markets and products is very likely, even if such an intention is
not expressly agreed to by the parties. 2
III. PROCEDURE
A. Premerger Notification
Article 4(1) provides that a concentration with a Commu-
nity dimension must be notified to the Commission within one
week after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement
of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
The "agreement" within the meaning of article 4(1) must be
legally binding on the parties. A legally binding agreement ex-
ists if the parties can no longer withdraw unilaterally from the
agreement and if it is intended to create a "relationship" upon
which each party can rely. 53 It is immaterial whether the agree-
ment is concluded subject to the consent of the shareholders
47. See Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 27, 5 (1991).
48. Driger/IBM/HMP, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J. C
236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817.
49. Id. 10; Apollinaris/Schweppes, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991),
cited in OJ. C 203/14 (1991); Baxter/Nestl6/Salvia, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 6,
1991), cited in OJ. C 37/11 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
50. Elf/Enterprise, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 24, 1991), cited in O.J. C 203/
14 (1991); Apollinaris/Schweppes, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 203/14 (1991); Baxter/Nestli/Salvia, slip op. 6, 9 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 6,
1991), cited in O.J. C 37/11 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
51. Elf/Enterprise, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 24, 1991), cited in OJ. C 203/
14 (1991).
52. ICI/Tioxide, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 28, 1990), cited in OJ. C 304/
27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
53. Id.
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or the authorization of the EC Commission. If, however, an
official authorization necessary for the agreement to be valid is
lacking, no agreement within the meaning of article 4(1) ex-
ists. 54
An agreement providing for an option to acquire a major-
ity shareholding does not in itself trigger the notification re-
quirement. The decisive factor is the exercise of the option.55
The announcement of a public bid triggers the notification re-
quirement even if the offer was rejected by the board of the
target company.5 6 The Commission also has held that an un-
dertaking that acquires a minority interest, and thereby trig-
gers the requirement under the U.K.'s "City Takeover Code"
to issue a public takeover bid for the majority of shares, causes
the notification period to begin to run only as of the announce-
ment of such public bid.57
Where the Commission finds that a notified operation
does not fall within the scope of application of the Merger
Regulation, it can treat, pursuant to article 5(1) of Commission
Regulation No. 2367/90,58 the notification as an application
for negative clearance or as a notification of an exemption pur-
suant to Regulation No. 17/62.' 9 The parties, however, must
request such an inquiry.
B. Other Points of Procedure
Article 7(1) provides that prior to notification and within
the first three weeks following the notification the concentra-
54. See BNP/Dresdner Bank, slip op. 2 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 4, "1991), cited in
0.J. C 34/20 (1991).
55. Elf/Ertoil, slip op. I 1 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 124/13
(1991); see Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 1, 4 (Eur. Comm'nJune 18, 1991), cited in 0.J. C
172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
56. AT&T/NCR, slip op. 1 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991), cited in 0J. C 16/20
(1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 330; Commission Press Release, IP (91) 48 (Jan. 21, 1991);
see Usinor/ASD, slip op. 1 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in 0J. C 193/34
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
57. La Redoute/Empire, slip op. 3 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 25, 1991), cited in O.J. C
156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
58. Commission Regulation No. 2367/90, OJ. L 219/5 (1990).
59. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.O. 204 (1962), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 87; see Form CO, supra note 9, § 7(2), 0J. L 219/11, at 18 (1990); see alo
Elf/Enterprise, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'n July 24, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 203/14
(1991); Apollinaris/Schweppes, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in
0.J. C 203/14 (1991).
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tion shall not be put into effect. Despite serious doubts as to
the compatibility of the concentration, the Commission will
not extend the suspension of a concentration if the parties con-
clude that the agreement is subject to the suspensive condition
of authorization under the Merger Regulation. Only in the
Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval decision has the Commission ruled in
favor of an extension of the three-week suspension order pur-
suant to article 7(2).6" This ruling, however, was lifted before
the final decision was issued.6' The Commission can, pursuant
to article 7(4), issue an exemption from suspension if an un-
dertaking has been acquired for the purpose of restructuring
and the restructuring operation is commenced immediately.62
Thus far there has been only one case in which a Member
State, the Federal Republic of Germany, has sent a notice to
the Commission under article 9(2). The Commission, how-
ever, dealt with the case itself and did not refer the case to the
competent national authority, the Federal Cartel Office, pursu-
ant to article 9(3).63
After being informed of the Commission's objections, the
parties to the concentration have the right of access to the
file." The Commission, however, may refuse access to infor-
mation obtained from competitors, customers or suppliers that
contains business secrets. The same policy applies to access to
the correspondence between the Commission and the Member
States. This practice leads to the question of whether the
Commission can base a prohibition decision under article 8(3)
on such correspondence and information, or whether the
Commission is barred from taking such information into ac-
count in its assessment. 65
60. Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, 0.J. L 290/35 (1991).
61. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 698 (July 22, 1991); Commission Press
Release, IP (91) 455 (June 23, 1991); Commission Press Release, IP (91) 220 (Mar.
23, 1991).
62. KELT/American Express, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 223/38 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 740.
63. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 304 (Dec. 4, 1991). For further details
with respect to article 9 of the Merger Regulation, see John Cook & Chris Kerse, EEC
Merger Control, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW MONOGRAPHS 128 (1991).
64. Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), 0.J. L 257/13, at 23 (1990); see
Commission Regulation No. 2367/90, art. 12(3), 0J. L 219/5, at 8 (1990).
65. See NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/
81, [19831 E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282; Allgemeine Elektricitits-Gesellschaft
AEG-Telefunken AG v. Commission, Case 107/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3151, 3192, [1984]
EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
Pursuant to article 18(4), in conjunction with article 15 of
Regulation No. 2367/90, third parties can be heard by the
Commission if they can demonstrate a sufficient interest. In
practice, such third party undertakings are invited to attend
the oral hearing of the parties. The Commission informs them
in advance in writing of the nature and subject matter of the
procedure. 66 This information is limited to the sending of the
Commission's press notice relating to the initiation of the pro-
ceeding. A copy of the statement of objections is not provided
to third persons and theyare not given access to the files.
IV. APPRAISAL OF THE CONCENTRATION
Concentrations with a "Community dimension" must be
assessed as to their compatibility with the Common Market
under article 2(1). The central criterion for the assessment,
discussed in article 2(2) and 2(3), is the creation or strengthen-
ing of a dominant position that would result in a significant
impediment of effective competition in the Common Market or
in a substantial part of it.
In its decisions, the Commission employs a two-step anal-
ysis to determine whether an undertaking that is involved in a
concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position.
First, the Commission defines the "relevant markets" affected
by the concentration in terms of product and geographical
markets. Second, it examines the implications of the concen-
tration for these markets.
A. The Relevant Product Market
1. Test of Demand Substitutability
The Commission defines the relevant product market pri-
marily on the basis of the "test of demand substitutability."
According to this test, a relevant product market comprises all
those products or product groups and/or services which are
regarded by the consumer as interchangeable or substitutable
by reason of their characteristics, prices and intended use.
6 7
3 C.M.L.R. 325, 390; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76,
[1979] E.C.R. 461, 510-14, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 267-70.
66. Commission Regulation No. 2367/90, art. 15(1), O.J. L 219/5, at 9 (1990).
67. See Form CO, supra note 9, § 5, 0J. L 219/11, at 15 (1990); see also Digital/
Kienzle, slip op. 11 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 56/16 (1991),
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In practice, the most significant criterion for interchangea-
bility and substitutability -is the intended use of the product.
Characteristics and price are relevant only to the extent that
they affect the intended use. If the main areas of use of a prod-
uct of groups of products are the same, they are interchangea-
ble.68 A lack of interchangeability in marginal areas or in ex-
ceptional cases is immaterial. Where the product is not substi-
tutable in a majority of cases, it is considered to represent a
market of its own.69
If the intended use is identical, the heterogeneous nature
of the products is immaterial. If, for example, drugs have the
same therapeutic qualities, they will belong to the same market
notwithstanding differing chemical composition. 70 However,
the differing, often technical, nature of a product can affect the
intended use. Thus, technical configurations among various
product groups and undertakings' different marketing meth-
ods argue against interchangeability. In Renault/Volvo, for ex-
ample, the different capabilities of trucks that weigh between
five and sixteen tons and trucks that weigh more than sixteen
tons provides an obvious example. 7' In such cases, the "tech-
nical frontier" will correspond to a "commercial frontier. '72
An identical product can belong to more than one distinct
market if it serves more intended uses, is supplied to different
consumer groups or is packaged in different sizes. In such
cases, the Commission takes into account, in particular, that
the supplier must adapt to the differing requirements of the
consumers. It considers quantities supplied, prices, customer
specifications, and distribution routes. Thus, for example, the
Commission has distinguished separate product markets for
starter batteries for initial equipment of new vehicles that are
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 11 (Eur. Comm'n
Feb. 8, 1991), cited in OJ. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
68. Cf. AT&T/NCR, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991) (stating software
operating systems usually not substitutable), cited in O.J. C 16/20 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 330.
69. Eridania/ISI, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 204/12
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 6, 12, 14 (Eur.
Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
70. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
71. Renault/Volvo, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in OJ. C
281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
72. Id.
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distinct from the replacement and retail markets.73
The existence of large price differences between different
product groups that in principle are interchangeable may indi-
cate a lack of actual interchangeability. For example, products
such as small and medium size computers, and the packaging
material of metal, glass or plastics may lack such actual inter-
changeability. 4
2. Test of Supply Substitutability
The Commission also may define the relevant product
market on the basis of supply substitutability. Based on the
European Court of Justice decision in Europemballage Corp. and
Continental Can Co. v. Commission,75 the Commission defines sup-
pliers collectively as a market group which through simple ad-
justment of the production machines and without extra costs
can switch to the production of another product.76 The possi-
bility of "simple production adjustment" indicates a sub-
stitutability of various products, and the existence, therefore,
of potential competition.7 7 Finally, the use of different raw
materials, which create varying high production costs for sup-
pliers, provides an argument against interchangeability and the
assigning of products to a single market. 8
B. The Relevant Geographic Market
The definition of the relevant geographic market is of pri-
73. See Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 27, 12 (1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc,
O.J. L 222/38, at 39, $$ 8-10 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146,
2147; see also Eridania/ISI, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in O.J. C
204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'n
Feb. 22, 1991), cited in O.J. C 56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330. In the informa-
tion processing systems sector, the Commission also clearly differentiates between
the original equipment market and the replacement market. AT&T/NCR, slip op.
15 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C 16/20 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 330.
74. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Otto/Grattan, slip op. 13 (Eur.
Comm'n Mar. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C 93/6 (1991); Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 10
(Eur. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991), cited in O.J. C 56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
75. Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199.
76. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 4 13, 44 (Eur. Comm'nJune 6, 1991), cited
in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
77. See id. 4 13-14; see also GLEISS & HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW
322-23 (Alfred Gleiss trans., 3d ed. 1981).
78. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 13 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
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mary significance in EC merger control and can be decisive for
the appraisal of a concentration. The parties to a concentra-
tion, as "national champions," frequently may have high mar-
ket shares in their home country but relatively low market
shares in the EC as a whole. If the relevant geographic market
is restricted to the territory of the relevant Member State, the
danger of prohibition is significantly greater than if a Commu-
nity-wide market is assumed.
Nonetheless, as a result of existing structures and a com-
petitive situation, a national market may still exist in a single
Member State while these conditions cease to exist in the re-
maining Member States.79 There is also the possibility that
more than one Member State or parts of a Member State to-
gether may form a relevant geographic market, such as Ger-
many, the Benelux countries, and northern France.80
The relevant geographical market is restricted to the terri-
tory of the EC. Under article 2, the Commission merely must
assess whether the concentration creates or strengthens a mar-
ket-dominating position in the Common Market or in a sub-
stantial part of it. From an economic point of view, the assess-
ment does not exclude the possibility that for a specific prod-
uct the relevant market may be the world market. Competitive
pressure from outside the Community must then be consid-
ered when assessing the market-dominating position.8' A
question central to the definition of the' geographic market is
whether a Community-wide market is to be assumed or
whether the relevant market must be restricted to a part
thereof, usually a Member State. The geographic market con-
sequently will depend on the competitive conditions in the rel-
evant geographical areas and Member States. According to
79. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 24 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991),
cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
80. Eridania/ISI, slip op. 25 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in O.J. C 204/
12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 15 (Eur.
Comm'nJune 6, 1991), cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 739.
81. Arospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, OJ. L 334/42, at 47, 20 (1991) ("The
commuter markets from an economic point of view are considered to be world mar-
kets. There are no tangible barriers to the importation of these aircraft into the
Community and there are negligible costs of transportation."); see A6rospatiale/
MBB, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991), cited in OJ. C 59/13 (1991); see also
Elf/Occidental, slip op. 9 8, 11 (Eur. Comm'nJune 13, 1991), cited in OJ. C 160/20
(1991).
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the Varta/Bosch 82 decision, there are two indicators of appreci-
able differences in the competitive conditions within the EC.
First, there are substantially differing market shares of the un-
dertakings in the different Member States.8 3 Second, substan-
tial price differences exist.84 Therefore, these markets are sep-
arate geographical and, frequently, national markets.
If such differences are found to exist, the Commission es-
tablishes their causes by means of a comparison of the market
structure that includes the nature and characteristics of the
product, buyer preferences, the structure of supply and de-
mand, and barriers to market entry. It then proceeds to make
an overall evaluation. The Commission clearly applies the cri-
teria of article 9(7) regarding the geographical reference mar-
ket and the definition of the relevant geographic market in sec-
tion 5 of Form CO. 85
1. Market Share and Price Differences
The Commission will find substantial market share differ-
ences if the national producers hold the largest market shares
in their "home market." In addition, national producers must
hold significantly higher market shares at home than in the for-
eign markets.86 To establish price differences between various
areas of the EC, the Commission compares the sales prices of
the producers or suppliers for the same product. The decisive
factor is the effective net price for re-sellers or end-purchasers,
not the producers' price lists. 87 Price differences of 100 per-
82. OJ. L 320/26 (1991).
83. Id. at 28, 18.
84. Id.
85. Form CO, supra note 9, § 5, Oj. L 219/11, at 15 (1990) ("The relevant geo-
graphic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved
in the supply of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are suffi-
ciently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas be-
cause, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those ar-
eas."); see Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 28, 17 (1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc,
OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146,
2148-49.
86. Arospatiale/MBB, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991), cited in O. C
59/13 (1991); see Varta/Bosch, Oj. L 320/26, at 28, 18 (1991); Magneti Marelli/
CEAc, Oj. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC
2146, 2148-49.
87. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991), cited
in OJ. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
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cent are considered substantial.8" The Commission also takes
into account the fact that suppliers determine sale prices differ-
ently from country to country.8 9 The absence of large price
differences between the various Member States and no na-
tional variation in the price policy of undertakings indicates
that sufficiently homogeneous competitive conditions exist in
the EC.90
2. Nature and Characteristics of the Goods and Services
If the nature' and characteristics of the product restrict its
mobility, the relevant geographic market may be narrower
than the overall territory of the Common Market. This may be
the case if different product lines are offered among the differ-
ent Member States, if discrepancies of quality exist,9' if differ-
ent local specification is required, 92 or if high transport costs
make delivery over long distances unfeasible.93 If on the other
hand homogeneous products whose transport does not entail
high costs are involved, as a rule a national market will not be
justified.
3. Buyer Preferences
In particular, national buying preferences, or preferences
for national markets and different brands in various Member
88. Magneti Marelli/CEAc, OJ. L. 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
89. Id.; see La Redoute/Empire, slip op. 4 12 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 25, 1991), cited
in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Otto/Grattan, slip op. I 11 (Eur.
Comm'n Mar. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C 93/6 (1991).
90. Eridania/ISI, slip op. 21 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 204/
12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'n
Jan. 4, 1991), cited in OJ. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245; ICI/Fioxide, slip op.
12 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 28, 1990), cited in OJ. C 304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
8.
91. See, e.g., Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 28, $$ 20, 21 (1991).
92. See, e.g., Renault/Volvo, slip op. 17 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in
OJ. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
93. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 156/10 (1991); see KELT/American Express, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'n Aug.
20, 1991), cited in OJ. C 223/38 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 740; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip
op. $ 13 (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991), cited in OJ. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 580; Elf/Occidental, slip op. 44 8, 11 (Eur. Comm'n June 13, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 160/20 (1991); Usinor/ASD, slip op. 4 8 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 193/34 (1991).
1991-1992] EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
States, may suggest a narrow market definition.94 In the food
distribution sector, for example, the existence of local markets
is assumed because consumers only seek food outlets in their
local areas.95 As a rule, however, the geographic market will
comprise the territory of the Community. Thus, a Commu-
nity-wide market will exist when the customers of a product are
experienced industrial undertakings that purchase from sup-
pliers from various states and with no significant preferences
for national products.96
4. Structure of Supply and Demand
The fact that the concentration of supply varies considera-
bly from one Member State to another can be a significant fac-
tor. In the Varta/Bosch decision, the Commission argued that
the greater the concentration of supply in one market the more
difficult it will be for actual or potential competitors to increase
their market shares or to penetrate a market.97 If, on the other
hand, all the important producers are present in all major
Member States, a balanced supply structure in the Community
will prevail.98
94. Renault/Volvo, slip op. 17 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990) ("[The bus] mar-
ket is still characterized by strong national buying preferences which constitute a
high barrier of entry for competitors from other Member States. In addition, there
are local specification requirements which can considerably impede transferability of
supply."), cited in 0J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906; see Varta/Bosch, 0J. L
320/26, at 28, 17 (1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc, 0.J. L 222/38, at 40, $ 16 (1991),
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. $
13 (Eur. Comm'nJune 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580;
Cargill/Unilever, slip op. 3(l)(b) (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 20, 1990), cited in OJ. C 327/
14 (1990).
95. Promodes/Dirsa, slip op. 8 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 17, 1990), cited in OJ. C
321/16 (1990).
96. P6chiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. $ 12 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991)
("[M]pme si l'on constate que les principaux utilisateurs-les constructeurs
d'automobiles-s'approvisionnent pour une part importante aupr s de fournisseurs
localis6s pros de leurs sites de production, leur dimension europ6enne et la
recherche d'une politique de diversification de leurs achats les am~nent i
s'approvisionner aupr~s d'entreprises situ~es dans divers pays de la Communaut6
europtenne."), cited in OJ. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; AT&T/NCR,
slip op. 13 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 28, 1991), cited in O.J. C 16/20 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 330; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
97. Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26, at 30, 31 (1991); see Magneti Marelli/CEAc,
OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146,
2148-49.
98. See, e.g., AT&T/NCR, slip op. $ 6 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 18, 1991) ("PCs and
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Differences in the structure of demand are important in-
dicators of differing competitive conditions. Differences in the
segmentation, significance and nature of the distribution chan-
nels can be significant. 99 For example, whether distribution
occurs by means of independent dealers, commercial agents or
commission agents as opposed to direct distribution will entail
competitive differences.' 0 0
5. Barriers to Entry
Market-related barriers to entry can result from state in-
tervention when state monopolies which are customers only
consider domestic suppliers for their procurement.' 0 ' Barriers
also can result from a state-regulated monopoly system, as in
the case of oil products, that prescribes reference quotas for
domestic suppliers and that permits the import of the monop-
oly product only on a very restricted scale.1 0 2
In the services area, barriers to market entry exist if free-
dom to establish and provide cross-border services has not
been fully effective as a result of differing supervisory and con-
trol regulations. 0 3 Customs duties, quotas, the prohibition of
trademarks, or the statutory restriction of the distribution of a
product through specific distribution channels can restrict en-
try to national markets. In addition, non-tariff barriers such as
type approvals, different product standards, or state price fix-
ing in individual Member States may create market entry barri-
small multi-use computers are to be considered on a Community-wide level. All ma-
jor manufacturers are represented in all Member States, and there are no price differ-
ences of major significance between the Member States."), cited in O.J. C 16/20
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
99. Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 29, 28 (1991).
100. Id. 29; see Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38, at 39, $ 11 (1991), Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148; La Redoute/Empire, slip op. 13
(Eur. Comm'n Apr. 25, 1991), cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
101. See, e.g., Alcatel/Telettra, O.J. L 122/48, at 52, 30 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778, 785. A different situation applies if undertakings from all Member
States participate in a public tender for a major project. Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez
SA/Hans Brochier GmbH & Co. KG, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'n July 11, 1991), cited
in OJ. C 188/20 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
102. Elf/Ertoil, slip op. 14 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in OJ. C 124/13
(1991); see BP/Petromed, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n July 29, 1991), cited in O.J. C
208/24 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 1 I (Eur. Comm'n
June 18, 1991), cited in OJ. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
103. For the insurance sector, see Groupe AG/Amev, slip op. 12 (Eur.
Comm'n Nov. 21, 1990), cited in OJ. C 304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
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ers.' °4 In such cases, the national territory may have to be con-
sidered the relevant geographic market. A national market,
however, will only be justified if such barriers cannot be over-
come at an acceptable cost.
Finally, the Commission affirms the existence of the na-
tional market if there are "economic" barriers to market entry,
despite the absence of any specific legal barriers in the EC. Ex-
amples of economic barriers include high supply concentra-
tions, 0 -5 the absence of European-wide brand names, 0 6 signifi-
cant differences in market development such as saturated as
opposed to growing markets, 10 7 and the effects of linguistic
differences or additional costs and delays in international dis-
patch that render cross-border deliveries economically and
practically unfeasible.'0° Market barriers also result from close
contractual relations between supplier and customer, such as
just-in-time delivery,' 0 9 or a tight distribution network main-
tained by undertakings in their home market in the case of
technically sophisticated products that require a rapid after-
sales service." ° An economic barrier can also be created by
vertical integration as a result of the minority shareholdings a
customer may hold in his suppliers." ' 1 The Commission meas-
ures the existence of economic barriers to market entry in
terms of, among other things, the scale of actual imports and
104. Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 14 (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C
172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; see Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, 31
(1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc, OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49; Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 52,
29 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778, 785; Eridania/ISI, slip op. 20 (Eur. Comm'nJuly
30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 204/12 (1991); Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 17 (Eur.
Comm'n June 10, 1991), cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Fiat
Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 20 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991), cited in OJ. C
118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
105. Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, 31 (1991).
106. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 19 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
107. La Redoute/Empire, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 25, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
108. Otto/Grattan, slip op. 11 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C
93/6 (1991).
109. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 15 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
110. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 20, 24 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8,
1991), cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
111. Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 52, 34 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778,
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cross-border deliveries.' 2
6. Future Market Development
In defining the relevant geographic market, the Commis-
sion considers not only present competitive conditions, but
also the likely development of the market. Here the correct
criterion is economic reality, not "wishful thinking."" 3 The
objective of completing the internal market as of December 31,
1992' '4 does not of itself mean that as of 1993 national mar-
kets will cease to exist. On the other hand, the economic coa-
lescence of national markets and the disappearance of obsta-
cles to trade in the context of the internal market must be
taken into account in defining the geographic market. While
presently there are still signs of national markets, the Commis-
sion must examine on a dynamic basis whether these markets
are transforming into EC-wide markets. This must include, for
example, whether state monopolies are liberalised,' 15 whether
different technical standards are harmonised,1 6 whether un-
dertakings increasingly diversify their operations on an inter-
national level," 7 and therefore, that the legal and economic
barriers that once isolated national markets and prevented free
cross-border competition will disappear. These changes will
enable undertakings to offer their goods on a cross-border ba-
sis and will justify the assumption of a European Community
112. Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26, at 32, 43 (1991); see Eridania/ISI, slip op.
21 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991) (commenting on scale of imports), cited in 0J. C
204/12 (1991).
113. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Die Europiiische Fusionhontrolle-Erste Erfahrungen,
1991 WIRTSCHAFr UND WETrBEWERB (WuW) 535, 541.
114. See Single European Act, art. 13, 0J. L 169/1 (1987) (amending Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 8(a), 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)).
115. BP/Petromed, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 29, 1991) (discussing recent
entry of Elf Aquitaine into capital of Spanish oil refining monopoly), cited in 0.J. C
208/24 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n
June 18, 1991) ("L'imminente 6ch~ance de la pfriode d'adaptation du monopole p6-
trolier espagnol, prvue dans r'Acte d'Adh~sion pour le 1.1.1992, n'est pas de nature
A avoir une incidence pr~visible i court et A moyen terme .... "), cited in 0J. C 172/8
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
116. See Alcatel/Telettra, 0.J. L 122/48, at 52, 31 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
778, 786 (stating that replacement of analogic technology by digital will erode some
technical barriers in medium to long term).
117. Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'nJune 24, 1991), cited
in 0J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
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market. In this context, the Commission is not primarily con-
cerned with the theoretical possibility of competition. In the
Commission's opinion, of greater importance with regard to
transitional markets is whether these markets will become a
single Community-wide market in the near future as a result of
actual market conditions.""
C. Creation or Strengthening of a Market Dominating Position
Within the framework used by the Commission to ap-
praise whether a concentration is compatible with the Com-
mon Market, the Commission must examine the future effects
of the concentration. This requires that the Commission
under article 2(2) and (3) forecast whether the concentration
will create or strengthen a dominant position in the relevant
markets.
Article 2(1) lists a number of market and undertaking re-
lated criteria to be considered by the Commission in determin-
ing its forecast. The most important of these is the market po-
sition of the undertakings participating in the concentration.
Market position is always the subject matter of the examina-
tion. The remaining factors are used by the Commission in its
assessment only if relevant in the individual case. Interest-
ingly, the Commission has not yet oncereferred to the criteria
of "development of technical and economic progress" that was
so controversial prior to the Merger Regulation's entry into
force. " 19
1. Market Position
The current market position of an undertaking is indicated
primarily by its market share. Market share is therefore highly
118. See BP/Petromed, slip op. 10 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 29, 1991), cited in OJ. C
208/24 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 12 (Eur. Comm'n
June 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; see also Alcatel/
Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 52, 30 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778, 786; Fiat Ge-
otech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 22 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991) ("Nel'insieme
questi fattori indicano in genere che mentre i mercati nazionali con tutta probabiliti
non sono ancora interamente scomparsi, specialmente in alcuni Stati membri ... la
loro importanza relativa rispetto ad un emergente mercato comunitario in fase di
declino."), cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Ehlermann, supra
note 113, at 541.
119. On this criterion, see Niemeyer, supra note 7, at 25, and Cook & Kerse,
supra note 63, at 78.
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significant. The Commission determines the market volume
and the market share of undertakings not by quantity or
number of units but by value.' 2° The basis for the calculation
of market volume and market share is sales in the geographi-
cally relevant market less exports plus imports.' 2 ' The market
shares of the undertakings, and of their group companies,
must be added.
The Merger Regulation does not provide any thresholds
beyond which market domination is presumed to apply. Sub-
stantial market shares, however, will indicate market control.
The higher such shares, the more carefully the Commission
examines the concentration, although market share clearly is
not the sole decisive factor. The Commission has never estab-
lished or denied the presence of a dominant position solely on
the basis of a specific market share, and it has always investi-
gated further aspects. Thus, very high market shares, such as
those over 70 percent, indicate the presence of market-domi-
nating positions or represent a basis for such a presump-
tion. 22 In an individual case, however, the presumption can
be rebutted. 2 It is questionable whether this practice can be
maintained after the European Court of Justice's ruling in
AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission. 2 4 Under AKZO, a market share
of 50 percent automatically establishes market domination. 2 5
In the Commission's view, a dominant position already can ap-
ply in the case of market shares of 40 percent and above, pro-
vided that the market share gap vis-d-vis the next largest com-
petitor is considerable and additional factors indicate market
120. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 17, 23 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8,
1991), cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
121. Form CO, supra note 9, § 5, Oj. L 219/11, at 15 (1990).
122. See, e.g., Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 53, 37 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778, 787 (up to 83 percent market share); Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 1
24 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991) (up to 74 percent share), cited in OJ. C 156/10
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Renault/Volvo, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7,
1990), cited in O.J. C 281/2 (1990) (69.7 percent share); see also Hoffmann-La Roche &
Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 521, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211,
275.
123. Alcatel/Telettra, O.J. L 122/48, at 53, $ 37 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778,
787 (83 percent market share); Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 9 24 (Eur. Comm'n
June 10, 1991) (up to 74 percent share), cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 739; Renault/Volvo, slip op. 9 18 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990) (69.7 per-
cent share), cited in O.J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
124. Case C-62/86, slip op. $ 60 (Eur. Ct. J. July 3, 1991) (not yet reported).
125. See id.
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domination.126
In Airospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 27 the first prohibition
decision under the Merger Regulation, the Commission found
that the proposed merger between two aircraft producers,
ATR, the joint venture between Aerospatiale of France and
Alenia of Italy, and de Havilland of Canada would give the pro-
ducers 66 percent of the EC market for turbo-prop commuter
aircraft and 50 percent of the world market for turbo-prop
commuter aircraft, thus creating a dominant market posi-
tion. ' 28
The Commission declared the proposed venture incom-
patible with the Common Market.' 29 The Commission based
its analysis on the fact that ATR/de Havilland's combined mar-
ket share would have been between two and three times higher
than that of the nearest remaining competitor, and that sub-
stantially smaller competitors in this market would not have
been able to challenge their position.13 0
On the other hand, the Commission has declined to find a
dominant position where market shares have been between 40
and 60 percent,' 3 ' on the basis of intense price competition1 2
126. See Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, $ 32 (1991); Magneti Marelli/CEAc,
OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146,
2148-49; Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 1 24 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. 1 13 (Eur.
Comm'nJan. 4, 1991), cited in OJ. C 5/7 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 245.
127. OJ. L 334/42, at 49, $ 25 n.1 (1991).
128. Id. 26 ("ATR and [de Havilland] after a merger would obtain worldwide a
share of about 50% of the overall commuter market and about 65% in the Commu-
nity.").
129. Id. art. 1, at 61.
130. Id. at 49-50, 54, 56, $$ 25, 29, 42, 51; see Commission Press Release, IP (91)
896 (Oct. 2, 1991).
131. Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, 32 (1991) (44 percent); Eridania/ISI,
slip op. 26, 28 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991) (over 50 percent), cited in OJ. C 204/
12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez SA/Hans Brochier
GmbH & Co. KG, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 11, 1991) (50 percent), cited in OJ.
C 188/20 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. $$ 15, 18 (Eur.
Comm'nJune 18, 1991) (42 percent), cited in OJ. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
580; Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. t 24 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991) (between 45
and 74 percent), cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Fiat Geotech/
Ford New Holland, slip op. 27 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991) (58 percent of Italian
market), cited in OJ. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip
op. 1 12, 13 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991) (40 percent), cited in OJ. C 5/7 (1991),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245; Renault/Volvo, slip op. 71 12-13 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7,
424 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL L WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:398
or a decline in demand or sales in the market concerned.13 3 In
cases of market shares under 40 percent, the Commission de-
clined to find a market-dominating position in the presence of
financially powerful competitors with similarly high shares and
large production capacities or low degrees of concentration in
the market concerned. 34 As to the "compatibility presump-
tion" in recital 15 of the Merger Regulation, 3 - the Commis-
sion thus far has deemed that mergers with a combined market
share of less than 25 percent a priori are compatible with the
Common Market. '3
6
The significance of market shares also depends on their
development. Market share losses, even in the case of rela-
tively high market shares, indicate effective competition.1
3 7
This applies afortiori if the losses were strongest just before the
concentration. 138 The current phase of the market also affects
the significance of the market shares. High market shares dur-
ing an expansion phase are not exceptional, and they do not
necessarily indicate market power, particularly if a change of
market leadership, or ongoing market share fluctuations and
competitive innovation, are taking place.' 3 9  On the other
hand, during a stagnation phase market share in conjunction
1990) (for the intermediate range of trucks, 54 percent in France), cited in 0J. C 281/
2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
132. E.g., Eridania/ISI, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 30, 1991), cited in O.J. C
204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663; Renault/Volvo, slip op. 14 (Eur. Comm'n
Nov. 7, 1990), cited in 0J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
133. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991),
cited in 0J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
134. See id. 23 (34 percent); see also Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 15 (Eur. Comm'n
June 18, 1991) (between 20 and 40 percent), cited in 0J. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 580; Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 19 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991) (22 per-
cent), cited in 0J. C 56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Cargill/Unilever, slip op.
3 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 20, 1990) (26 percent or less in each of several markets), cited in
0J. C 327/14 (1990).
135. Merger Regulation, supra note 1, recital 15, OJ. L 257/13, at 15 (1990).
136. See Renault/Volvo, slip op. 12-14 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in
0.J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
137. See Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 18, 28 (Eur. Comm'n Feb.
8, 1991), cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
138. See id. 28.
139. See VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 38 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited
in 0J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 20 (Eur.
Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991), cited in 0J. C 56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; AT&T/
NCR, slip op. 15 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 16/20 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 330.
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with low price competition may carry greater significance.' 41
In the case of horizontal concentrations, for the purposes
of its forecast, the Commission adds together the market
shares of the parties and compares them with those of the re-
maining competitors. 1 4 1 In principle, therefore, the market
share of the parties to the concentration corresponds to the
sum of the market shares previously realized by them. Nega-
tive reactions, however, must be taken into account where cus-
tomers may be likely to modify their purchasing behaviour by
changing to competitors in order to avoid becoming depen-
dent on the new undertaking. 42
2. The Other Relevant Factors in Article 2(1)
a. Economic and Financial Power
Economic and financial power can be an indicator of mar-
ket power. The Commission's decisions thus far are not clear
as to how this criterion is to be established and measured. The
Commission apparently bases economic and financial power
on turnover. It attributes particular importance to financial
power: high-level financial power, in conjunction with high
market shares, can create significant competitive advantages
and result in market dominance. A competitive advantage may
occur, for example, if operation in the market requires a high
level of investment and if after the merger one undertaking can
gain access to the considerable financial resources of the
other. 143
In the case of joint ventures, the Commission takes into
account the financial power not only of the joint venture but
also of the parent companies. 44 Financial power can indicate
market power only if the parties to the concentration exceed
the financial power of their competitors. If the competitors
140. See Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38, at 40, $ 16 (1991), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
141. See id. at 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [199112 CEC 2146, 2148; see also
Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 30, 32 (1991); Eridania/ISI, slip op. 26 (Eur.
Comm'nJuly 30, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
142. Alcatel/Telettra, 0J. L 122/48, at 53, 40 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778,
787.
143. See Matsushita/MCA, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 10, 1991), cited in OJ.
C 12/15 (1991); see also Varta/Bosch, 0J. L 320/26, at 30, 33, $$ 32, 58 (1991).
144. See Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
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also possess economic and financial power, however, despite
the presence of high market shares a market dominance gener-
ally will be precluded. 45
b. Access to Supplies or Markets
A merger that establishes a vertical relationship between
an undertaking and its supplier or its customer can procure
significant advantages vis-d-vis competitors, and thus result in a
strengthening of the market position. 146 An undertaking may
procure an advantage, for example, if it gains improved access
to raw materials by virtue of a vertical concentration 47 or if it
enhances its sales or distribution possibilities through a con-
centration with its distributors that formerly was linked only by
contract. 4  An undertaking's strengthened market position is
always subject to the finding that the vertical integration ren-
ders access to upstream or downstream markets more difficult
for non-integrated competitors or that it precludes them from
those markets by means of the "foreclosure effect.' 1
49
Foreclosure effects can lead to the creation of a dominant
position if the undertaking already held a strong market posi-
tion prior to the concentration.' 50 Such effects can arise
where, for example, significant cost advantages over competi-
145. Compare Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, $ 32 (1991) with Magneti
Marelli/CEAc, OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2
CEC 2146, 2148-49. See also Matsushita/MCA, slip op. 9 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 10,
1991), cited in O.J. C 12/15 (1991).
146. AT&T/NCR, slip op. 16 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C 16/
20 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; ICI/Tioxide, slip op. T$ 13, 15 (Eur. Comm'n
Nov. 28, 1990), cited in OJ. C 304/27 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
147. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 41 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; see Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/
38, at 40, 16 (1991),'Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
148. Nissan/R. Nissan, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J. C
181/21 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 581; Usinor/ASD, slip op. $ 14 (Eur. Comm'n
Apr. 29, 1991), cited in OJ. C 193/34 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
149. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. $$ 42, 51 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991),
cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 739; Usinor/ASD, slip op. 17 (Eur.
Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in OJ. C 193/34 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663;
AT&T/NCR, slip op. 17 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 28, 1991), cited in OJ. C 16/20 (1991),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; ICI/Tioxide, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 28, 1990), cited
in OJ. C 304/27 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
150. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 41 (Eur. Comm'nJune 6, 1991) (leading
firm), cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; AT&T/NCR, slip op. $ 17
(Eur. Comm'n Jan. 18, 1991) (strengthening of already strong market position), cited
in O.J. C 16/20 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
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tors arise as a result of enhanced access to raw materials.'15
c. Barriers to Entry
With regard to "legal or other barriers to entry," obstacles
must be assessed in relation to undertakings that cannot oper-
ate in a market or those that can do so but only with difficulty.
Entry barriers determine the significance of potential competi-
tion in a relevant market. In principle, high market barriers
reduce potential competition, and low or no barriers to entry
render competition probable. 5 2 Regulatory or legal barriers
to entry may include a state monopoly, differing national stan-
dards and protection rights, a quota regime, 15 import restric-
tions for Japanese cars,' 54 or long-standing exclusive distribu-
tion systems. 155 The vertical integration of undertakings, a na-
tional purchasing policy of an important customer, 56 or the
so-called "lock-in" effect, which concerns economic and tech-
nical constraints that tend to prevent customers from switching
from one manufacturer to another, represent other forms of
entry barriers. 157
d. Actual or Potential Competition from Inside or Outside
the European Community
Article 2(1)(a) directs the Commission to consider compe-
tition from outside the Community in assessing the effect of a
concentration. If the Commission finds that on economic
grounds the relevant geographic market is the world market, it
must consider the competitive pressures from outside the
Community to assess the dominance of Community undertak-
151. See ICI/Tioxide, slip op. $ 18 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 28, 1990), cited in O.J. C
304/27 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 8.
152. See Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 21 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
153. See Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 53, 38 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R.
778, 787; see also Eridania/ISI, slip op. $ 26 (Eur. Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 204/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 663.
154. Nissan/R. Nissan, slip op. 4(c) (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 181/21 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 581.
155. Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 25 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991),
cited in 0.J. C 118/14 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R 330.
156. Alcatel/Telettra, 0J. L 122/48, at 53-54, 99 39, 44 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778, 787.
157. See Arospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 0J. L 334/42, at 52, 33 (1991).
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ings. 158 As a result of the absence of significant legal or other
entry barriers into Community markets, potential competition
from undertakings outside the EC must be considered when
market entry is probable. Competitive pressure from outside
the EC can prevent a dominant market position even in the
case of high market shares.' 59 The Commission, however,
does not investigate the competitive effects of a merger on
markets outside the EC.' 60
e. Purchasing Power
The purchasing power of an undertaking's customers
plays an important role in appraising an undertaking's market
dominance. A competitive counterbalance to the market
strength of suppliers occurs when only a few customers repre-
sent the major part of the purchasing volume in the relevant
market, resulting in substantial price pressure on suppliers,
even if customers possess high market shares themselves.' 6 '
Purchasing power is reflected in such strategies as the playing-
off of suppliers against each other, that is, "dual or triple
sourcing," the power of customers to determine product qual-
ity, size, and timing of deliveries, such as do car manufacturers
vis-d-vis their suppliers, or the dependence of a supplier on a
few financially strong purchasers.'
62
158. A4&rospatiale/MBB, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991) ("Given the
absence of barriers to market entry and the mutual penetration of the markets be-
tween the EC, the USA and the rest of the world, the civil helicopter market is from
an economic point of view a world market. The competitive pressure from outside
the Community has, therefore, to be considered in the assessment of whether the
proposed concentration could lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position which would significantly impede effective competition in the common mar-
ket."), cited in OJ. C 59/13 (1991).
159. Id.; see also Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 53-54, 43 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778, 788-89.
160. BNP/Dresdner Bank, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 4, 1991), cited in OJ.
C 34/20 (1991).
161. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 41 (Eur. Comm'n June 6, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
162. Pchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. 14 (Eur. Comm'nJune 24, 1991), cited
in O.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; VIAG/Continental Can, slip op.
38 (Eur. Comm'nJune 6, 1991), cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739;
Renault/Volvo, slip op. 14 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in O.J. C 281/2
(1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906.
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3. Summary
Thus far, the Commission decisions have always assessed
all of the relevant business and market-related aspects in a con-
cluding summary to determine whether the concentration cre-
ates or strengthens a market-dominating position of a new en-
tity or a party participating in a concentration. 163 The Com-
mission has never based compatibility on any single criterion
of article 2(1).11 In particular, the Commission has empha-
sized high market shares, financial power and barriers to entry.
Additional aspects considered are those related to the individ-
ual case. Market power is indicated, for example, if the market
shares of the next largest competitors are substantially lower
or where there exists higher production capacity,' 65 low price
competition, 6 6 or synergy effects relating to research, devel-
opment and production. 
67
Aspects that provide arguments against market dominance
include higher market shares of competitors,' 68 high im-
ports, 16 9 innovation competition' 70 and, in particular, intense
price competition.' 7 ' The Commission must rule that the con-
centration is compatible with the Common Market when the
analysis of the factors in article 2(1) does not permit a definite
conclusion as to the existence of a market-dominating posi-
tion. Thus, "Non Liquet" cases may not be detrimental to the
parties to a concentration. 72
In its substantive merger analysis, the Commission distin-
guishes between the "horizontal," ",vertical" and "conglomer-
163. E.g., Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 33, 58 (1991).
164. See id. at 30, 32; see also Magneti Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38, at 40, 16
(1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
165. See Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 30, 32 (1991).
166. See Magneti Marelli/CEAc, OJ. L 222/38, at 40, 16 (1991), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2148-49.
167. VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 36 (Eur. Comm'nJune 6, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 156/10 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
168. See Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 15 (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991), cited in O.J.
C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580.
169. Id. 18.
170. See VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 38 (Eur. Comm'nJune 6, 1991), cited
in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
171. See Renault/Volvo, slip op. 18 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in O.J. C
281/2 (1990), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 906; see also Eridania/ISI, slip op. 26 (Eur.
Comm'n July 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 204/12 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 663.
172. See, e.g., Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 33, 62 (1991).
4291991-1992]
430 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:398
ate" aspects of a concentration. The competitive danger of
horizontal concentration derives primarily from the addition of
the parties' market shares. 73 In the case of a vertical concen-
tration, the creation or strengthening of a market-dominating
position can result from improved access to downstream or up-
stream markets or from the reinforcement of barriers to entry.
Conglomerate concentrations, i.e., concentrations of un-
dertakings that operate neither on the same product market
nor in the same upstream or downstream markets, also can
have an adverse effect on competition. The Commission ex-
amines the conglomerate aspects of a merger only where the
parties concerned have shares of over 25 percent in one mar-
ket. When this threshold is exceeded, undertakings are obli-
gated, pursuant to section 5 of Form CO, to provide market
data on their conglomerate aspects. 74 The effects of conglom-
erate concentration can be particularly adverse for competition
the more the parties' operational areas are closely related.
75
Factors such as the flow of technical or commercial know-how,
the financial strength of a party to a concentration, economies
of scale, synergy effects in the area of research and develop-
ment, and expansion of the range offered can increase the
market power of a party to a concentration.1 76
D. Oligopoly
The concept of joint market dominance is not specifically
mentioned in the Merger Regulation. However, the Commis-
sion obviously assumes that the creation or strengthening of a
market-dominating position by more than one undertaking can
result in incompatibility with the Common Market. 77 In
173. See Alcatelirelettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 53, $ 37 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
778, 787.
174. ASKO/Omni, slip op. $ 11 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991), citedin OJ. C 51/
12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; see Form CO, supra note 9, § 5, O.J. L 219/11, at
15 (1990).
175. AT&T/NCR, slip op. TT 23, 28 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1991), cited in O.J. C
16/20 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
176. Id. 27; see VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 36 (Eur. Comm'n June 6,
1991), cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739.
177. E.g., Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 30, 32 (1991) (stating that existence
of equally strong competition could lead to alignment of behavior of both competi-
tors); see also Cook & Kerse, supra note 63, at 80; Martin Schodermeier, Collective Domi-
nance Revisited: An Analysis of the EC Commission's New Concepts of Oligopoly Control, 11
EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 28 (1990). See generally James S. Venit, The Evaluation of
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Varta/Bosch,178 the Commission did not exclude the possibility
of joint market dominance in the event that the concentration
results in the creation of two equally strong competitors with
market shares of approximately 80 percent, and the existence
of these two equally strong competitors could lead to an align-
ment of their behaviour.179 The meaning of an "alignment of
the behaviour of competitors" is far from clear. In contrast to
a German merger control situation under section 23(a)(2) of
the Act Against Restraints on Competition, 8 1 the Commission
does not have a statutory presumption with regard to the exist-
ence of collective market dominance. The Commission there-
fore must prove that a behavioral alignment can be expected in
the future between the members of the oligopoly. This obvi-
ously creates major problems for the Commission. Thus far, it
has considered the possibility of joint market dominance in
only one case.' 8 ' In other cases, the Commission has not even
mentioned the issue of joint market dominance, although it
would have seemed appropriate based on the examination of
the given market structure.8 2 The future importance of joint
market dominance in European merger control will therefore
be insignificant.
E. Ancillary Restraints
Recital 25 of the Merger Regulation states that the regula-
tion applies where the undertakings concerned accept restric-
tions that are directly related and necessary to the implementa-
Concentrations Under the Merger Control Regulation: The Nature of the Beast, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 412, 435-37 (1990-1991).
178. O.J. L 320/26 (1991).
179. Id. at 30, 32.
180. Act Against Restraints of Competition ofJuly 27, 1957 (Legal Gazette I, at
1081), amended by Fifth Act to Amend the Act Against Restraints of Competition of
December 22, 1989 (Legal Gazette I, at 2486) (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerb-
sbeschriinkungen vom .27. Juli 1957 (BGBI. I S. 1081) unter Beriicksichtigung des
Fiunften Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen
vom 22. Dezember 1989 (BGBI. I S. 2486)).
181. Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26, at 30, 32 (1991).
182. See, e.g., EIf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. 20 (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991) (two
undertakings with joint market shares of 86 percent), cited in 0.J. C 172/8 (1991),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 37 (Eur. Comm'n June 6,
1991) (two undertakings with joint market shares of 76 percent), cited in 0.J. C 156/
10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 19 (Eur. Comm'n Feb.
22, 1991) (three undertakings with joint market shares of 80 percent), cited in 0.J. C
56/16 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
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tion of the concentration. 8 3 The details regarding the assess-
ment of these restrictions, known as ancillary restraints, have
been published in a Commission notice. 84 Article 8(2)(2) of
the Merger Regulation requires that a decision of compatibility
also cover such restrictions.
A non-competition clause in cases of the transfer of an un-
dertaking is justified provided that it is limited to the products
and services that have been transferred. In geographic terms,
such a clause must be limited to the area where the vendor
established the products prior to the transfer. The duration of
the non-competition clause as a rule may not exceed five years
from conclusion of the agreement. 85
Non-competition clauses imposed on parent companies
vis-d-vis the joint venture can be recognized as ancillary since
the parent companies achieve permanent withdrawal from the
joint venture's market. Such non-competition clauses can con-
stitute an obligation on the parent company not to operate ex-
cept only through the joint venture or to have the joint venture
manufacture products as exclusive supplier. Such clauses also
can bar parent companies from acquiring competitors of the
joint venture. 186
The Commission also has permitted an exclusive licence
that grants the acquiror the right to use a trademark or the
183. Merger Regulation, supra note 1, recital 25, OJ. L 257/13, at 16 (1990).
184. Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations,
OJ. C 203/5 (1990) [hereinafter Commission Notice].
185. ICLUNokia Data, slip op. $ 6 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 17, 1991) (one year), cited
in OJ. C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; VIAG/Continental Can, slip op. 52
(Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991) (three years), cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 739; Digital/Kienzle, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1991) ("limited"
but exact time limit not specified), cited in OJ. C 56/16 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R.
330; ASKO/Omni, slip op. 6 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C 51/12
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330; Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 7 (Eur.
Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991) (four years), cited in OJ. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
330.
186. See Driager/IBM/HMP, slip op. 7 12, 20 (Eur. Comm'n June 28, 1991),
cited in OJ. C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817; P~chiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op.
16 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in O.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
580; Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. 1 25 (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), cited in O.J. C
156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739; RVI/VBC/Heuliez, slip op. 7 (Eur.
Comm'n June 3, 1991), cited in OJ. C 149/15 (1991); Conagra/IDEA, slip op. 15
(Eur. Comm'n May 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580;
ASKO/Jacobs/Adia, slip op. 4 (Eur. Comm'n May 16, 1991), cited in O.J. C 132/13
(1991).
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vendor's trading name for the products of the business area to
be transferred for a period of ten years.18 7 Here, the Commis-
sion goes beyond the scope of its Notice Regarding Restric-
tions Ancillary to Concentrations, which generally permits only
non-exclusive licenses for the exploitation of intellectual prop-
erty rights or trading names.' 88
Finally, reciprocal supply agreements'" or specific serv-
ices previously rendered by the undertaking which have been
transferred to the vendor can be retained for a transitional pe-
riod. However, retention must be the only way of ensuring the
continuation of the vendor's operation. Moreover, an accepta-
ble ancillary restraint is an obligation for the vendor to con-
tinue rendering all services previously rendered to the trans-
ferred undertaking to the acquiror for a transitional period of
four years.' 90
F. Obligations and Conditions
The Commission can attach obligations and conditions to
its decision, giving conditional clearance to a concentration.
These requirements are "intended to ensure that the under-
takings concerned comply with the commitments they have en-
tered into vis-d-vis the Commission with a view to modify the
original concentration plan" pursuant to article 8(2)(2). 19 1
The Commission has imposed the following obligations: re-
moval of a vertical link between a purchaser and a supplier, 192
reduction of a majority interest to reduce the market shares of
the entity created by the concentration, 193 and termination of a
license agreement between a party to the concentration and its
competitor as well as a waiver of equal representation on the
187. See Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. 7 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8,
1991), cited in OJ. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
188. Commission Notice, supra note 184, OJ. C 203/5, at 7, $$ 3(B)(2), 3(B)(4)
(1990).
189. See ICL/Nokia Data, slip op. TT 6, 16 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 17, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 817.
190. See Otto/Grattan, slip op. 5 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 21, 1991), cited in O.J. C
93/6 (1991).
191. Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8(2), OJ. L 257/13, at 19 (1990).
192. Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48, at 54, 45 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778,
789.
193. Magneti Marelli/CEAc, OJ. L 222/38, at 41, T 20 (1991), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2146, 2149-50.
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management and supervisory boards of these two undertak-
ings. 94 In one case the Commission made its obligations sub-
ject to a "binding commitment" on the part of an undertaking
not party to the concentration. 95
CONCLUSION
Cross-border concentrations with a European Community
dimension now fall under one-stop merger control. Thus,
such concentrations are no longer subject to a variety of often
inconsistent national antitrust regulations and several national
antitrust authorities.
First impressions of the Commission's practice are posi-
tive. The Merger Task Force members are ready and willing to
discuss proposed concentrations in informal meetings with the
companies concerned, e.g., to determine whether a joint ven-
ture is concentrative or whether the concentration would be
compatible with the Common Market. The members of the
Merger Task Force, however, may not give binding evaluations
on the proposed concentration because decision-making pow-
ers lie with the Commission. Only the Commission can make
decisions as to the compatibility of concentrations under the
Merger Regulation. These decisions are made by a unitary in-
stitution comprised of a collegiate body of seventeen Commis-
sioners who decide by simple majority.
In its decisions, the Commission has evidently based its
analysis on "economic" criteria, without regard to any indus-
trial policy arguments. Nonetheless, the Commission has
sometimes been affected in its assessment of compatibility by
the political pressure and influence exerted on commissioners
by Member States.
The current system of turnover thresholds may result in
large transactions falling outside the scope of the Merger Reg-
ulation if all the companies concerned achieve more than two-
thirds of their turnover in the same Member State. Very small
concentrative joint ventures, however, may fall within the regu-
lation's scope since the turnover of the parent companies must
be considered regardless of the significance of the joint ven-
ture. Due to the current high thresholds, many transactions
194. Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26, at 33-34, 63 (1991).
195. Alcatel/Telettra, Commission Press Release, IP (91) 303 (Apr. 12, 1991).
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without a Community dimension are often subject to stricter
standards, as is the case with German national antitrust law.
This will change, however, because turnover thresholds most
likely will be lowered by 1994.
With regard to the Commission's assessment of the com-
patibility of a concentration, the first decisions indicate that
even very high market shares often do not trigger a dominant
position. The question of whether a concentration may be
prohibited on the basis of the creation or strengthening of a
joint market-dominating position, or oligopoly, is now more
urgent. The future relevance of the Merger Regulation thus
depends on the use of joint dominance as a criterion to assess
concentrations. Absent the possibility of such a criterion, the
Merger Regulation's importance will be minimal.
